Automated vehicle control systems need to solve social dilemmas to be disseminated
Automated vehicle control systems need to solve social dilemmas to be disseminated
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DOI：
10.1016/j.chaos.2020.109861
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发表时间：
2020-09
影响因子：
7.8
通讯作者：
J. Tanimoto;Masanori Futamata;Masaki Tanaka
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Tanimoto;Masanori Futamata;Masaki Tanaka
基于修正的S-NFS模型，建立了一个新的元胞自动机交通模型，该模型考虑了多车道系统下自动车和人工驾驶车的混合流。该模型进一步将自动驾驶车辆分为两类：（1）具有自适应巡航控制的车辆和（2）具有支持所谓的队列驾驶的协作自适应巡航控制的车辆。一种有利于最大化个人收益的车辆，这确保了最小化自己的旅行时间，同时最大化全球交通流量，这是整个社会所期望的。密集的模拟，其中自动驾驶和人类驾驶的车辆被假定为合作（C）和缺陷（D）的策略，分别显示，一个D-策略总是比一个C-策略，以最大限度地提高个人的回报，只要一个较小的合作分数被强加。同时，社会最优可以通过仅包括自动车辆的情况来实现。这种猎鹿的社会困境意味着，自动车辆控制系统（AVCS）不能渗透到人口的人类驾驶的车辆，如果传播阶段开始从一个单一的车辆与AVCS。
A new cellular automata traffic model based on the revised S-NFS model was established to consider a mixed flow of automated and human-driven vehicles assuming a multi-lane system. The model further classified automated vehicles into two categories: (1) vehicles with adaptive cruise control and (2) those with cooperative adaptive cruise control that supports so-called platoon driving. A vehicle that favors maximizing individual payoff, which ensures minimizing its own travel time, while maximizing global traffic flux was expected as the entire society. Intensive simulations, wherein automated and human-driven vehicles were presumed as cooperative (C) and defective (D) strategies, respectively, revealed that a D-strategy is always better than a C-strategy to maximize individual payoff as long as a smaller cooperative fraction is imposed. Meanwhile, social optimal could be realized by a situation comprising only automated vehicles. Such a stag-hunt social dilemma implied that an automated vehicle control system (AVCS) cannot permeate into a population of human-driven vehicles if the dissemination stage starts from a single vehicle with an AVCS.