Resolving double moral hazard problems with buyout agreements
Resolving double moral hazard problems with buyout agreements
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DOI：
10.2307/2601019
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发表时间：
1991-01
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Joel Demski;D. Sappington
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Joel Demski;D. Sappington
我们考虑一个双重道德风险问题，其中双方的努力，例如，最初拥有企业的委托人和企业中规避风险的代理人，是无法核实的。企业随机利润流的实现价值也是无法验证的。也没有第三方来打破“平衡预算”的要求。然而，当委托人可以观察代理人的行为，并有权要求代理人以事先商定的价格购买企业时，双重道德风险问题可以完全和无成本地解决。
We consider a double moral hazard problem in which the efforts of two parties, e.g., a principal who initially owns an enterprise and a risk-averse agent in the enterprise, are not verifiable. The realized value of the enterprise's random profit stream is also unverifiable. There is also no third party to break a "balanced budget" requirement. Nevertheless, the double moral hazard problem can be resolved completely and costlessly when the principal, who can observe the agent's actions, has the option of requiring the agent to purchase the enterprise at a prenegotiated price.