Reasoning and Delusion Proneness: Confidence in Decisions
Reasoning and Delusion Proneness: Confidence in Decisions
复制标题
推理和妄想倾向：决策的信心
DOI：
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发表时间：
2008
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
Debbie M. Warman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Debbie M. Warman
本研究旨在探讨妄想倾向个体的推理能力。在一般人群中，70名健康个体完成了妄想倾向的测量，并参与了8项困难的概率推理任务的试验，4项情绪中立，4项情绪突出，并被要求报告他们对自己的决定的信心水平。虽然妄想倾向的个人没有要求任何更少的刺激推理任务比个人谁不是妄想倾向，妄想倾向的个人更有信心，他们的决定比个人谁不是妄想倾向，更有信心，他们的决定在第一次审判，无论类型的刺激。此外，尽管要求更少的信息比突出的任务，妄想倾向的个人报告同等的信心在这两个任务。妄想倾向和妄想发作可能与过度自信的决定，特别是过度自信的初步判断。
The present study was an investigation into the reasoning of delusion prone individuals. Seventy healthy individuals in the general population completed a measure of delusion proneness and engaged in 8 trials of difficult probabilistic reasoning tasks, 4 emotionally neutral and 4 emotionally salient, and were asked to report their level of confidence in their decisions. While delusion prone individuals did not request any fewer stimuli on reasoning tasks than did individuals who were not delusion prone, delusion prone individuals were more confident in their decisions on the neutral task than individuals who were not delusion prone and were more confident in their decision on the first trial, regardless of the type of stimuli presented. Further, despite requesting less information on neutral than salient tasks, delusion prone individuals reported equivalent confidence on both tasks. Delusion proneness and delusion onset may be related to overconfidence in decisions, particularly overconfidence in initial judgment.