Central Bank Reputation in a Forward-Looking Model
Central Bank Reputation in a Forward-Looking Model
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前瞻性模型中的央行声誉
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1706086
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Olivier Loisel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Olivier Loisel
本文在标准新凯恩斯模型中考察了声誉担忧是否会导致中央银行实施时间不一致的最优货币政策。有趣的是，这个模型的前瞻性使我们能够解释私人代理人在其触发策略的惩罚长度上的协调。我们的研究结果表明，通货膨胀的偏见和稳定的偏见，可以克服声誉有关的中央银行在文献中使用的校准。这些结果使我们能够内生伍德福德的永恒的观点，并倾向于削弱最近的货币政策代表团的建议。
This paper examines whether reputation concerns can induce the central bank to implement the time-inconsistent optimal monetary policy in the standard New Keynesian model. Interestingly, the forward-looking nature of this model enables us to account for the coordination of the private agents on the punishment length of their trigger strategy. Our results suggest that both the inflation bias and the stabilization bias can be overcome by a reputation-concerned central bank for the calibrations used in the literature. These results enable us to endogenize Woodford's timeless perspective and tend to weaken the case for recent monetary policy delegation proposals.