Veto Bargaining and Coalition Formation: A Theory of Presidential Policymaking with Application to Venezuela
Veto Bargaining and Coalition Formation: A Theory of Presidential Policymaking with Application to Venezuela
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否决权谈判和联盟形成：适用于委内瑞拉的总统决策理论
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1991086
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Eric Magar
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Octávio Amorim Neto;Eric Magar
本文报告了一项正在进行的工作。我们扩展了一个简单的、完全信息的行政立法讨价还价模型，该模型是为美国设计的政策进行讨价还价，以适应委内瑞拉的情况。我们首先处理两种制度之间的两个主要差异：委内瑞拉总统比美国总统拥有更弱的否决权，委内瑞拉总统可以发起法案。根据该模型的假设，有两个主要预测：不应出现否决权，也不应否决任何由行政部门发起的法案；这两个假设背后的逻辑都是预期。来自委内瑞拉(1959-1995)的证据证明了这两个预测都是错误的，表明模型的一些假设过于严格。我们试探性地提出了一个更完整的模型应该是什么样子的建议。然后，我们谈到委内瑞拉和美国总统制的第三个不同之处：委内瑞拉总统经常在选举后结成联盟，以提高他们在议会中的支持率。我们发现强有力的证据证明了这一立法策略的一个效果：联合内阁在立法机构对他们的计划有更好的支持。
This paper reports a work in progress. We extend a simple, complete-information model of executive-legislative bargaining over policy devised for the U.S. to fit the case of Venezuela. We first deal with two major differences between the two systems: Venezuelan presidents have a weaker veto than their U.S. counterparts, and Venezuelan presidents can initiate bills. Two main predictions follow from the model’s assumptions: no veto should ever occur, and no executive-sponsored bill should ever be defeated; the logic behind both hypotheses is anticipation. The evidence from Venezuela (1959-1995) falsifies both predictions, suggesting that some of the model’s assumptions are too restrictive. We make tentative suggestions of what a more complete model should look like. We then address a third difference between the presidential systems of Venezuela and the U.S.: Venezuelan presidents often make post-election coalitions to improve their support in the assembly. We find strong evidence of one effect of this legislative strategy: coalition cabinets have better support for their programs in the legislature.