Redistributive Taxation in the Roy Model
Redistributive Taxation in the Roy Model
复制标题
罗伊模型中的税收再分配
DOI：
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Florian Scheuer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Casey G. Rothschild;Florian Scheuer
我们认为最佳的再分配模型中，个人可以自我选择到几个可能的部门之一的基础上异质性的多维技能向量。我们首先表明，当政府不观察其公民的部门选择或潜在的技能，受约束的帕累托边界可以实施一个单一的非线性所得税。然后，我们描述了这个最优税收计划。如果部门投入是互补的，那么具有自我选择的多部门模型会导致最优所得税，其累进性低于自然条件下标准单部门模型中的相应税收。然而，与典型的多部门经济相比，它们的进步性更大，这些经济具有离散的类型，没有职业选择或重叠的部门工资分配。
We consider optimal redistribution in a model where individuals can self-select into one of several possible sectors based on heterogeneity in a multidimensional skill vector. We first show that when the government does not observe the sectoral choice or underlying skills of its citizens, the constrained Pareto frontier can be implemented with a single non-linear income tax. We then characterize this optimal tax schedule. If sectoral inputs are complements, a many-sector model with self-selection leads to optimal income taxes that are less progressive than the corresponding taxes in a standard single-sector model under natural conditions. However, they are more progressive than in canonical multi-sector economies with discrete types and without occupational choice or overlapping sectoral wage distributions.