Dominantly Truthful Multi-task Peer Prediction with a Constant Number of Tasks

Dominantly Truthful Multi-task Peer Prediction with a Constant Number of Tasks
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任务数量恒定的显性真实多任务同行预测

DOI:
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发表时间:
2019
期刊:
ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Yuqing Kong
Yuqing Kong
中科院分区:
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文献类型:
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作者:
Yuqing Kong

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在参与者被问到多个类似的可能是主观的多项选择问题的设置中(例如,你喜欢熊猫快递吗?你喜欢Chick-fil-A吗?Y/N),设计了一系列的同伴预测机制来激励诚实报告,其中一些实现了显性真实性:说真话是一种显性策略,并在一定的温和条件下严格优于其他“非排列策略”。然而,一个主要问题阻碍了这些机制的实际使用:它们要求参与者执行无限数量的任务。当参与者执行有限数量的任务时,这些机制只能实现近似的主导真实性。存在一个占主导地位的真实的多任务同行预测机制,只需要有限数量的任务仍然是一个悬而未决的问题,可能有一个负面的结果,即使有充分的先验知识。 本文回答了这个问题,提出了一个新的机制,基于决定因素的互信息机制(DMI机制),这是占主导地位的真实任务的数量至少是2C和参与者的数量至少是2。C是每个问题的选择数(对于二元选择题,C=2)。除了激励诚实的报告外,DMI-Mechanism还可以转换为信息评估规则,当至少有3个参与者时,该规则可以识别高质量的信息而无需验证。据我们所知,DMI-Mechanism是第一个适用于有限数量任务的主要真实机制,而不是一个小的恒定数量的任务。
In the setting where participants are asked multiple similar possibly subjective multi-choice questions (e.g. Do you like Panda Express? Y/N; do you like Chick-fil-A? Y/N), a series of peer prediction mechanisms are designed to incentivize honest reports and some of them achieve dominantly truthfulness: truth-telling is a dominant strategy and strictly dominate other "non-permutation strategy" with some mild conditions. However, a major issue hinders the practical usage of those mechanisms: they require the participants to perform an infinite number of tasks. When the participants perform a finite number of tasks, these mechanisms only achieve approximated dominant truthfulness. The existence of a dominantly truthful multi-task peer prediction mechanism that only requires a finite number of tasks remains to be an open question that may have a negative result, even with full prior knowledge. This paper answers this open question by proposing a new mechanism, Determinant based Mutual Information Mechanism (DMI-Mechanism), that is dominantly truthful when the number of tasks is at least 2C and the number of participants is at least 2. C is the number of choices for each question (C=2 for binary-choice questions). In addition to incentivizing honest reports, DMI-Mechanism can also be transferred into an information evaluation rule that identifies high-quality information without verification when there are at least 3 participants. To the best of our knowledge, DMI-Mechanism is the first dominantly truthful mechanism that works for a finite number of tasks, not to say a small constant number of tasks.