ELLSBERG'S PARADOX AND THE VALUE OF CHANCES
ELLSBERG'S PARADOX AND THE VALUE OF CHANCES
复制标题
艾尔斯伯格悖论和机会的价值
DOI：
10.1017/s0266267115000358
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
1.2
通讯作者：
Bradley R
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bradley R
我们应该对获得一件物品的机会给予什么样的价值？本文认为，与冯·诺依曼和摩根斯坦的理论相反，某些好的G的机会的值可能是G值的非线性函数。特别是，机会可能具有边际效用递减，这一性质被称为机会不确定性厌恶。代理人厌恶机会的不确定性的假设解释了在埃尔斯伯格悖论中经常观察到的偏好模式。虽然这些偏好通常被用来反驳贝叶斯决策理论，它表明，机会风险厌恶是完全兼容的。
What value should we put on our chances of obtaining a good? This paper argues that, contrary to the widely accepted theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern, the value of a chance of some good G may be a non-linear function of the value of G. In particular, chances may have diminishing marginal utility, a property that is termed chance uncertainty aversion. The hypothesis that agents are averse to uncertainy about chances explains a pattern of preferences often observed in the Ellsberg paradox. While these preferences have typically been taken to refute Bayesian decision theory, it is shown that chance risk aversion is perfectly compatible with it.