Consociational settlements in deeply divided societies: the liberal-corporate distinction
Consociational settlements in deeply divided societies: the liberal-corporate distinction
复制标题
深度分裂社会中的联合解决方案：自由派与企业派的区别
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Allison W. McCulloch
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Allison W. McCulloch
联合主义经常被提议用于沿着种族界限严重分裂的社会，但其建议仍然存在争议。批评者认为，它的采用率很低，导致政治僵化，并巩固了它试图缓解的分歧。然而，在许多批评中忽视了自由主义和社团形式的联合主义之间的区别，或者是对参与权力分享的族裔群体的自决或预先决定的区别。文章认为，是否同样适用于两个版本的批评。公司联合会在时间上冻结了一个特定的集团间配置，导致了旷日持久的执行组建，在某些情况下，还导致了部门的固化。然而，自由主义的联合会也遇到了自己的困难：联合会的解决方案通常是在群体身份在政治上最突出和最具分裂性的时候谈判的。在这种情况下，各群体不太可能满足于保证其权力份额之外的任何东西，从而使自由联合主义不太可能在谈判解决方案中得到采纳。本文还考虑了促进采用自由主义联合规则的因素。
Consociationalism is often proposed for societies deeply divided along ethnic lines, yet its recommendation remains contentious. Critics argue that it has a low rate of adoption, results in political immobilism, and entrenches the divisions it seeks to alleviate. Overlooked in much of the criticism, however, is the distinction between liberal and corporate forms of consociationalism, alternatively premised on the self-determination or predetermination of the ethnic groups involved in power-sharing. The article considers whether the critiques apply equally to both versions. Corporate consociation freezes a particular inter-group configuration in time, leading to drawn-out executive formation and, in some cases, to a cementing of divisions. However, liberal consociation runs into its own difficulties: consociational settlements are generally negotiated at the very point at which group identities are most politically salient and divisive. Under these conditions, groups are unlikely to settle for anything other than a guarantee of their share in power, thus making liberal consociationalism less likely to be adopted in negotiated settlements. The article also considers the factors enhancing the adoption of liberal consociational rules.