The Formation and Long-run Stability of Cooperative Groups in a Social Dilemma Situation
The Formation and Long-run Stability of Cooperative Groups in a Social Dilemma Situation
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社会困境下合作群体的形成及其长期稳定性
DOI：
10.1111/ijet.12056
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
0.5
通讯作者：
Toshimasa Maruta
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Akira Okada;Toshimasa Maruta
我们考虑了在追求个人利益与社会福利最大化相冲突的社会困境中合作群体的形成和长期稳定性。Young（）的适应性博弈模型被应用到一个群体形成博弈中，在这个博弈中，自愿参与者通过谈判来创建一个强制合作的机构。对于这类具有两种类型的群体形成博弈，随机稳定均衡可以用相关鹰鸽博弈的纳什积来表征，鹰鸽博弈概括了博弈中个体之间的策略互动。
We consider the formation and long‐run stability of cooperative groups in a social dilemma situation where the pursuit of individual interests conflicts with the maximization of social welfare. The adaptive play model of Young () is applied to a group formation game where voluntary participants negotiate to create an institution that enforces cooperation. For the class of group formation games with two types, the stochastically stable equilibrium can be characterized in terms of the Nash products of the associated hawk–dove games, which summarize the strategic interaction among the individuals in the game.