Relationship Investing: Large Shareholder Monitoring with Managerial Cooperation
Relationship Investing: Large Shareholder Monitoring with Managerial Cooperation
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发表时间：
1998-11
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通讯作者：
N. Chidambaran;Kose John
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作者：
N. Chidambaran;Kose John
我们描述了大型机构股东和公司经理建立关系投资的条件，其中经理在监督过程中积极与机构合作，以解决代理问题。我们模型的设置是一个私下知情的经理在一个具有更快解决不确定性的项目和一个具有延迟解决不确定性的项目之间做出选择。代理问题产生的原因是，经理有动机关注公司的感知市场价值，而不是其真正的长期价值，通过他的薪酬合同，并导致投资扭曲。研究表明，关系投资解决了代理问题，减少了与大股东监管相关的搭便车问题。我们还表明，在某些条件下，股东通过增加经理关注公司感知市场价值的激励，以诱导他在监督过程中合作，从而使经理的薪酬更具扭曲性，这是最优的。
We characterize conditions under which a large institutional shareholder and the manager of a firm will establish relationship investing, wherein the manager actively cooperates with the institution in the monitoring process, to resolve agency problems. The setting of our model is that of a privately informed manager choosing between a project that has a faster resolution of uncertainty and a project that has a delayed resolution of uncertainty. The agency problem arises because the manager has incentives to focus on the firm's perceived market value, rather than its true long-term value, through his compensation contract and leads to investment distortions. We show that relationship investing solves the agency problem and reduces the free-riding problem associated with large shareholder monitoring. We also show that under some conditions it is optimal for shareholders to make the manager's compensation more distortionary by increasing the manger's incentives to focus on the firm's perceived market value, in order to induce him to cooperate in the monitoring process.