PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE Research Article A Dynamic Model of Guilt Implications for Motivation and Self-Regulation in the Context of Prejudice
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE Research Article A Dynamic Model of Guilt Implications for Motivation and Self-Regulation in the Context of Prejudice
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2007
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内疚被广泛认为是一种重要的自我调节情绪，但另一种理论认为内疚主要是一种惩罚暗示或亲社会动机。综合这些观点，我们提出罪恶感动态地发挥作用，首先提供与减少的接近动机相关的负强化线索，当出现修复机会时，负强化线索转化为接近动机行为。我们在种族偏见的背景下检验了这一假设。白人受试者观看一系列多种族面孔，同时用脑电图记录大脑皮层活动。在虚假反馈表明反黑反应之后，受试者报告罪恶感升高，这与额叶皮质不对称的变化有关，表明接近动机降低。当研究对象有机会参与减少偏见的行为时，内疚预示着他们对减少偏见的兴趣更大，这反过来又与额叶不对称的方法相关的转移有关。研究结果支持一个动态模型，即内疚与动机和行为的适应性变化有关。内疚一直被认为在自我调节中起着关键作用。弗洛伊德（1930/1961）将罪恶感定义为自我和超我之间的冲突，其作用是使一个人的行为符合道德标准，同时惩罚因本我而犯的过错。内疚在群体间领域的功能最早是由Allport（1954）提出的，他将内疚描述为一种“道德不安”和“内心检查”，它驱使平等主义者纠正偏离其无偏见标准的行为（另见Myrdal， 1944）。经典和当代理论同样指出了内疚在调节社会行为中的重要性，将内疚定义为一种消极的情感体验，当一个人的行为达不到个人或社会标准时，就会引起这种体验，并激发修复行为（Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Frijda, 1994; Lewis, 1971; Mosher, 1965; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996; Tomkins, 1963）。然而，现有文献对内疚的功能解释并不一致，一些理论家强调自我惩罚功能，而另一些理论家则强调亲社会、修复功能。还有一些人认为，在有偏见的行为之后的补偿行为仅仅是“象征性”的姿态，以减轻对一个人的平等主义的怀疑（例如，Dutton和Lennox， 1974）。本研究旨在通过研究群体间偏见背景下与趋近退缩动机相关的神经激活来调和不同的内疚功能观。内疚的理论解释理论家认为，内疚是由人际关系的违法行为引起的，并以自我失望的方式经历（相比之下，羞耻通常以自我厌恶的方式经历；Tangney & Dearing, 2002）。然而，内疚的自我调节功能的说法不同，特别是关于其潜在的方法-退缩动机取向。一种观点认为，罪恶感主要是作为一种惩罚暗示，促进强化学习和对违法行为的抑制（Monteith, 1993）。在几项研究中，蒙蒂思和她的同事研究了内疚感在群体间行为自我调节中的作用（Devine，蒙蒂思，Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991；蒙蒂思，1993；蒙蒂思，Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Czopp, 2002）。这个研究项目表明，低偏见的受试者在得知自己以偏见回应后，内疚感会增加，他们的内疚感与抑制正在进行的行为和参与自我反省有关。根据蒙蒂思的说法，这样的经历训练了一个人对暗示潜在偏见的环境线索更加警惕，这反过来又使他更加小心。地址：纽约大学心理学系大卫·m·阿莫迪奥，纽约，NY 10003，电子邮件：david.amodio@nyu.edu。心理科学524卷18 - 6版权所有2007心理科学协会应对未来情况。这些发现表明，内疚与接近动机的减少有关。另一种理论解释认为，内疚的作用主要是促进亲社会行为（Baumeister et ., 1994; Baumeister, Stilwell, & Heatherton, 1995; Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2006; Tangney, 1991）。这种亲社会视角将内疚置于社会背景中看待，其中内疚就像其他“社会情绪”，如羞耻和尴尬，作为一种永远存在的惩罚幽灵，使人们的行为符合其社区的道德标准（Frijda, 1994）。一项研究考察了个人对诱发罪恶感情景的回顾性描述，将罪恶感与改善社会关系的努力联系起来（Baumeister et al., 1995; Tangney & Dearing, 2002）。与蒙蒂思及其同事的研究结果相反，支持亲社会解释的研究将内疚与接近动机联系起来。罪恶感的两种功能——一种是犯罪行为的抑制者，另一种是亲社会行为的促进者——强调了不同的动机过程和行为结果。然而，这些说法可能是互补的。蒙蒂思和她的同事们把罪恶感作为一种行为抑制剂，强调罪恶感的初始体验，它的功能是阻止由违法行为造成的人际伤害。她的研究旨在评估在实际犯罪时发生的与内疚相关的过程。相比之下，强调亲社会解释的研究者（例如，Baumeister等人，1994,1995;Tangney, 1991）关注的是罪恶感对人际关系中后续行为的远端影响。我们认为，综合考虑，这些不同的理论焦点表明了内疚的动态功能，即内疚的体验最初与正在进行的行为的中断和减少接近倾向有关，以停止违法行为，调查损害，并从错误中吸取教训。内疚的功能随后转变为促进对修复行为的接近反应，旨在弥补过去的过错，并在未来的情况下表现得更得体。因此，内疚的近端和远端功能之间的关键区别在于动机取向的转变和相应的行为变化。
Guilt is widely recognized as an important selfregulatory emotion, yet alternative theoretical accounts view guilt primarily as either a punishment cue or a prosocial motivator. Integrating these views, we propose that guilt functions dynamically to first provide a negative reinforcement cue associated with reduced approach motivation, which transforms into approach-motivated behavior when an opportunity for reparation presents itself. We tested this hypothesis in the context of racial prejudice. White subjects viewed a multiracial series of faces while cortical activity was recorded using electroencephalography. Following bogus feedback indicating anti-Black responses, subjects reported elevated guilt, which was associated with changes in frontal cortical asymmetry indicating reduced approach motivation. When subjects were presented with an opportunity to engage in prejudice-reducing behavior, guilt predicted greater interest in prejudice reduction, which in turn was associated with an approach-related shift in frontal asymmetry. The results support a dynamic model in which guilt is associated with adaptive changes inmotivation and behavior. Guilt has long been regarded as playing a critical role in selfregulation. Freud (1930/1961) conceptualized guilt as conflict between the ego and superego, functioning to keep one’s behavior in line with moral standards while punishing id-inspired transgressions. The function of guilt in the intergroup domain was first articulated by Allport (1954), who described guilt as a ‘‘moral uneasiness’’ and ‘‘inner check’’ that drives egalitarians to correct behavior deviating from their nonprejudiced standards (see also Myrdal, 1944). Classic and contemporary theorizing has likewise noted the importance of guilt in the regulation of social behavior, defining guilt as a negative affective experience that is evoked when one’s behavior falls short of personal or societal standards and that motivates reparatory behavior (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Frijda, 1994; Lewis, 1971; Mosher, 1965; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996; Tomkins, 1963). However, the extant literature suggests inconsistent functional accounts of guilt, with some theorists emphasizing a self-punishment function and others emphasizing a prosocial, reparatory function. Still others have suggested that reparatory behaviors following a prejudiced act serve merely as ‘‘token’’ gestures to assuage doubts of one’s egalitarianism (e.g., Dutton & Lennox, 1974). The present research was designed to reconcile alternative functional views of guilt by examining neural activations associated with approach-withdrawal motivation in the context of intergroup bias. THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF GUILT Theorists agree that guilt is elicited by an interpersonal transgression and experienced as self-disappointment (by contrast, shame is typically experienced as self-loathing; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). However, accounts of guilt’s self-regulatory function differ, particularly with respect to its underlying approach-withdrawal motivational orientation. One view posits that guilt functions primarily as a punishment cue that promotes reinforcement learning and inhibition of the transgressive behavior (Monteith, 1993). Across several studies, Monteith and her colleagues have examined the role of guilt in the self-regulation of intergroup behavior (Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Monteith, 1993; Monteith, Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Czopp, 2002). This program of research has shown that lowprejudice subjects report increased guilt after learning they have responded with prejudice, and their feelings of guilt are associated with inhibition of ongoing behavior and engagement in self-reflection. According to Monteith, such experiences train an individual to be more vigilant of environmental cues indicating the potential for bias, which in turn cause more careful Address correspondence to David M. Amodio, Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY 10003, e-mail: david.amodio@nyu.edu. PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 524 Volume 18—Number 6 Copyright r 2007 Association for Psychological Science responding in future situations. These findings suggest that guilt is associated with a reduction of approach motivation. An alternative theoretical account suggests that guilt functions primarily to facilitate prosocial behavior (Baumeister et al., 1994; Baumeister, Stilwell, & Heatherton, 1995; Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2006; Tangney, 1991). This prosocial perspective views guilt within a societal context, in which guilt, like other ‘‘social emotions’’ such as shame and embarrassment, serves as an everpresent specter of punishment that keeps people’s behavior in line with the moral standards of their community (Frijda, 1994). Research examining individuals’ retrospective accounts of guiltinducing situations has associated guiltwith efforts to improve social relationships (Baumeister et al., 1995; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). In contrast to the findings of Monteith and her colleagues, research supporting the prosocial account has linked guilt with approach motivation. The two functions ascribed to guilt—as an inhibitor of transgressive behavior versus a promoter of prosocial behavior—highlight different motivational processes and behavioral outcomes. Yet these accounts may be complementary. Monteith and her colleagues’ focus on guilt as a behavioral inhibitor emphasizes the initial experience of guilt, which functions to halt the interpersonal damage being caused by the transgressive behavior. Her research was designed to assess guilt-related processes occurring in the moment of an actual transgression. By contrast, researchers emphasizing a prosocial account (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1994, 1995; Tangney, 1991) have focused on the more distal implications of guilt for subsequent behaviors in interpersonal relationships. We propose that, when considered together, these alternative theoretical foci suggest a dynamic function of guilt, whereby the experience of guilt is initially associated with the interruption of ongoing behavior and a reduction in approach tendencies in order to halt a transgression, survey the damage, and learn from mistakes. The function of guilt then transforms to promote approach responses toward reparatory behaviors, aimed at making up for past transgressions and behaving more appropriately in future situations. Hence, the critical difference between proximal and distal functions of guilt concerns shifting motivational orientations and corresponding changes in behavior.