Changes in corporate governance and top executive turnover: The evidence from Japan
Changes in corporate governance and top executive turnover: The evidence from Japan
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jjie.2017.12.006
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发表时间：
2018-03-01
影响因子：
2.9
通讯作者：
Saito, Takuji
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Miyajima, Hideaki;Ogawa, Ryo;Saito, Takuji
我们研究了1990-2013年期间日本企业高管的更替情况。在此期间，主要银行的存在被削弱，机构投资者的所有权迅速增加，许多公司引入了独立的外部董事。我们发现，高层管理人员更换的敏感性，企业业绩并没有改变，尽管怀疑日本企业的公司治理。另一方面，营业额最敏感的业绩指标从资产收益率（罗阿）转向净资产收益率（ROE）和股票收益率。我们还研究了这种变化的可能来源。研究发现，银行危机后，当外资机构投资者持股比例大幅增加时，其对净资产收益率的换手率敏感性增强。这一结果让我们可以解读为它们开始发挥惩戒作用。相比之下，我们没有发现独立外部董事对提高营业额对净资产收益率的敏感性有任何显着影响，除非公司任命的独立外部董事超过三名。虽然主要银行的权力范围已大大缩小，但与主要银行的密切联系增加了最近一段时期的周转敏感性，表明主要银行继续在管理纪律方面发挥一定的作用。
We examine the turnover of top executives in Japanese firms throughout the period 1990-2013. During this time, the presence of a main bank has been weakened, the ownership of institutional investors has rapidly increased, and independent outside directors have been introduced in many firms. We find that top executive turnover sensitivity to corporate performance has not changed despite skepticism on corporate governance of Japanese firms. On the other hand, there is a shift from return on assets (ROA) to return on equity (ROE) and stock returns as performance indicators that turnover is most sensitive to. We also examine possible sources of this change. We find that foreign institutional investors strengthen the turnover sensitivity to ROE after banking crisis when their shareholding has dramatically increased. This result allows us to interpret that they began to play a disciplinary role. In contrast, we do not find that independent outside directors have any significant effect of enhancing turnover sensitivity to ROE, unless a firm appointed independent outside directors more than three. While the scope of the main bank's authority has substantially contracted, strong ties with main banks increase turnover sensitivity in the more recent period, indicating that main banks continue to perform a certain role in disciplining management.