Altruism Design in Networked Public Goods Games
Altruism Design in Networked Public Goods Games
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DOI：
10.24963/ijcai.2021/69
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发表时间：
2021-05
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Sixie Yu;D. Kempe;Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Sixie Yu;D. Kempe;Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
许多集体决策环境的特点是，出于个人自身利益而行事的代理人与促进共同利益的代理人之间存在战略紧张关系。其中包括在大流行期间戴口罩、投票和接种疫苗。网络公共物品游戏抓住了这种紧张关系，网络编码了代理之间的战略相互依赖。公共物品博弈的传统模型仅将个人自身利益作为动机，尽管长期以来人们都知道利他动机在代理人的决策中发挥着重要作用。我们引入了公共物品博弈的新颖扩展，通过在效用函数中添加一个术语来解释利他动机，该术语包含代理人从他人福利中获得的感知利益，并以利他主义图为中介。最重要的是，我们认为利他主义不是一成不变的，而是促进共同利益的杠杆。然后，我们的核心算法问题围绕着修改利他网络以实现所需的公共物品游戏投资概况的计算复杂性。我们首先证明，当委托人可以部分修改利他网络时，可以使用线性规划来解决该问题。虽然如果委托人的行为是全有或全无，那么问题通常会变得棘手，但我们展示了一些易于处理的特殊情况。
Many collective decision-making settings feature a strategic tension between agents acting out of individual self-interest and promoting a common good. These include wearing face masks during a pandemic, voting, and vaccination. Networked public goods games capture this tension, with networks encoding strategic interdependence among agents. Conventional models of public goods games posit solely individual self-interest as a motivation, even though altruistic motivations have long been known to play a significant role in agents’ decisions. We introduce a novel extension of public goods games to account for altruistic motivations by adding a term in the utility function that incorporates the perceived benefits an agent obtains from the welfare of others, mediated by an altruism graph. Most importantly, we view altruism not as immutable, but rather as a lever for promoting the common good. Our central algorithmic question then revolves around the computational complexity of modifying the altruism network to achieve desired public goods game investment profiles. We first show that the problem can be solved using linear programming when a principal can fractionally modify the altruism network. While the problem becomes in general intractable if the principal’s actions are all-or-nothing, we exhibit several tractable special cases.