Default risk in a model of corporate and government finance
Default risk in a model of corporate and government finance
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公司和政府财务模型中的违约风险
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(82)90067-6
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发表时间：
1982
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
David C. Webb
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
David C. Webb
提出了一个简单的框架来分析企业和政府财务决策的相互作用。企业和家庭债务违约起着核心作用，对莫迪利亚尼-米勒和李嘉图等价命题的真实性都有影响。该分析的新颖之处在于该模型的一般均衡反映了三个不同家庭群体的相互作用。我们展示了在存在违约风险的情况下，债券融资转移如何影响自然状态下的消费机会并影响私人资本的形成。影响的不同取决于莫迪利亚尼-米勒命题的真假。
A simple framework is proposed to analyse the interaction of corporate and government financial decisions. Default on corporate and household debt plays a central role having implications for the truth of both the Modigliani–Miller and Ricardian equivalence propositions. The novelty of the analysis is that the general equilibrium of the model reflects the interaction of three distinct groups of households. We show how, in the presence of default-risk bond financed transfers affect consumption opportunities across states of nature and affect private capital formation. The affects differ depending on whether the Modigliani–Miller proposition is true or false.