Corruption and public procurement: example from Croatia
Corruption and public procurement: example from Croatia
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腐败与公共采购：克罗地亚的例子
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Jelena Budak
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Ateljević;Jelena Budak
转型过程的社会和经济方面一直是理论和实证研究的焦点，约有二十年。在共产主义和国家计划经济体制垮台后，新的市场和民主政府体制被引入，并产生了有争议的结果。关于这些过渡进程中出现的体制问题，有大量文献。大多数研究人员认为，转型的成功取决于具体国家和路径。西巴尔干国家与其他转型期国家有一些共同的问题，但也受到一系列具有深远影响的冲突的困扰。许多西巴尔干半岛的问题是所采用的复杂过渡模式以及国家结构崩溃后造成的体制真空和民主赤字的直接产物。西巴尔干半岛的国家在政治上已经稳定下来，因为他们努力进入欧盟和北约等国际一体化。一体化进程加快了改革，但整个区域的经济体仍然落后于其他转型期国家，并正在失去在世界市场上的竞争优势。20世纪90年代的情况导致国家法律的结构薄弱，为新兴的“寡头”阶层提供了肥沃的土壤，包括战时和政治效忠者，以及那些接近各种有组织犯罪网络的人。这导致了“国家俘获”现象，即一个国家的精英企业塑造了经济游戏规则，
Social and economic aspects of transition processes have been the focus of theoretical and empirical study for about two decades. After the fall of communism and state-planned economic systems, new market and democratic government systems were introduced with controversial results. There is an abundant literature on institutional issues that emerged during those transition processes. Most researchers have argued that the success of the transformation is country-specific and path-dependent. The countries of the Western Balkans shared some problems with other transitional countries, yet have also been troubled by a series of conflicts with far-reaching consequences. Many Western Balkan problems have been direct products of the complex model of transition that was applied, as well as of the institutional vacuums and democratic deficits created in the wake of the collapse of state structures. The Western Balkan states have been stabilized politically as they put their efforts into accessing international integrations such as the EU and NATO. The integration process speeded up reforms, yet economies across the region still lag behind other transition countries and are losing competitive edge in the world market. The situation in the 1990s resulted in weak national legal structures providing fertile grounds for the emerging class of the ‘entrepreneur-oligarch’ including wartime and political loyalists, and those close to various networks of organized crime. This contributed to the phenomenon of ‘state capture’ in which the business of a country’s elite shapes the rules of the economic game and