On Market Games When Agents Cannot Be in Two Places at Once
On Market Games When Agents Cannot Be in Two Places at Once
复制标题
当代理无法同时出现在两个地方时的市场游戏
DOI：
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
C. Qin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Rodney J. Garratt;C. Qin
摘要我们考虑的市场中，代理人提供他们的时间或服务的资本货物和市场的持续时间是有限的。我们证明了一个联盟博弈可以产生这样的市场当且仅当该博弈的特征函数是超可加的。经济文献分类号：C71，D51。
Abstract We consider markets in which agents supply their time or the services of a capital good and the duration of the market is limited. We show that a coalitional game can be generated by such a market if and only if the characteristic function of the game is superadditive. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, D51.