Trust, treason, and trials: An example of how the evolution of preferences can be driven by legal institutions
Trust, treason, and trials: An example of how the evolution of preferences can be driven by legal institutions
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DOI：
10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023399
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发表时间：
1998-04-01
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Huck, S
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Huck, S
本研究试图通过提供一个例子来扩大法律和经济学的范围，即法律的制度不仅通过改变不同行为的成本-收益关系对当前行为产生短期影响，而且还可以驱动偏好的演变。因此，法律的设计对行为的长期影响是立法者不应忽视的。该研究提出了一个简单的合作模式，其中只有一方可以选择观察共同努力的结果。虽然这一方可以假装合作失败，但另一方可以选择监视其合作伙伴。该模型考虑了资源变量和心理变量，反映在背叛的情况下悔恨。假设参与者根据给定的偏好理性行事，但偏好可能会在进化过程中发生变化。结果表明，“好的”法律的制度设计可以排挤“坏的”偏好。
This study tries to enlarge the scope of law and economics by providing an example that legal institutions do not only have short-run effects on present behavior by changing the cost-benefit relation of different actions but can also drive the evolution of preferences. Therefore legal design has long-run effects on behavior which should not by neglected by legislators. The study presents a simple model of cooperation where only one party has the option to observe the outcome of joint efforts. While this party can pretend a failure of cooperation, the other party has the option to monitor its partner. The model considers resource variables and a psychological variable reflecting remorse in case of betrayal. Players are assumed to behave rationally according to given preferences, but preferences may change in the course of evolution. The results show that a "good" design of legal institutions can crowd out "bad" preferences.