How to subsidize energy efficiency under duopoly efficiently?
How to subsidize energy efficiency under duopoly efficiently?
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双寡头垄断下如何高效补贴能效？
DOI：
10.1016/j.apenergy.2016.04.105
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发表时间：
2016-08-01
期刊：
影响因子：
11.2
通讯作者：
Wang, Zhao-hui
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Nie, Pu-yan;Yang, Yong-cong;Wang, Zhao-hui
本文建立了博弈论模型，捕捉了古诺竞争和斯塔克尔伯格竞争下产出补贴对能源效率的影响。模型考虑了三种补贴类型，即无补贴、单边补贴和双边补贴。研究结果表明，没有补贴的企业不愿意提高能源效率。此外，补贴刺激了受补贴企业的产出，同时抑制了其他企业的产出。同时，均衡补贴强度取决于企业的地位。此外，还提出了不同情况下的最低补贴预算。特别是，在补贴预算固定的情况下，如果该企业处于领先地位，则该企业的产出最高。另外，一定的补贴可以减少排放总量，而逾期补贴则无法达到环保目标。 (C) 2016 Elsevier Ltd. 保留所有权利。
Establishing a game theory model, this paper captures the effects of output subsidy on energy efficiency under Cournot competition and Stackelberg competition. Three types of subsidies are considered in the model, namely without subsidy, unilateral subsidy and bilateral subsidy. The findings indicate that firms without subsidy are not willing to improve energy efficiency. Also, subsidy stimulates the subsidized firms' outputs while deters the outputs of other firms. Meanwhile, the equilibrium subsidy intensity depends on firms' position. Furthermore, the minimal subsidy budgets under different situations are presented. Especially, given the fixed subsidy budget, the output of the subsidized firm is the highest if this firm plays the leading position. In addition, certain subsidy can reduce the total emission, while overdue subsidy cannot reach the environmental object. (C) 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.