Posted Price Mechanisms for a Random Stream of Customers
Posted Price Mechanisms for a Random Stream of Customers
复制标题
针对随机客户群发布的价格机制
DOI:
10.1145/3033274.3085137
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发表时间:
2017
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
T. Vredeveld
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
J. Correa;Patricio Foncea;R. Hoeksma;Tim Oosterwijk;T. Vredeveld
Posted price mechanisms constitute a widely used way of selling items to strategic consumers. Although suboptimal, the attractiveness of these mechanisms comes from their simplicity and easy implementation. In this paper, we investigate the performance of posted price mechanisms when customers arrive in an unknown random order. We compare the expected revenue of these mechanisms to the expected revenue of the optimal auction in two different settings. Namely, the nonadaptive setting in which all offers are sent to the customers beforehand, and the adaptive setting in which an offer is made when a consumer arrives. For the nonadaptive case, we obtain a strategy achieving an expected revenue within at least a 1-1/e fraction of that of the optimal auction. We also show that this bound is tight, even if the customers have i.i.d. valuations for the item. For the adaptive case, we exhibit a posted price mechanism that achieves a factor 0.745 of the optimal revenue, when the customers have i.i.d. valuations for the item. Furthermore, we prove that our results extend to the prophet inequality setting and in particular our result for i.i.d. random valuations resolves a problem posed by Hill and Kertz. [13]
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-662-48350-3_42
发表时间:
2015-07
期刊:
ArXiv
影响因子:
--
作者:
H. Esfandiari;M. Hajiaghayi;Vahid Liaghat;M. Monemizadeh
通讯作者:
H. Esfandiari;M. Hajiaghayi;Vahid Liaghat;M. Monemizadeh