Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation
Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation
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DOI：
10.1016/j.tpb.2006.07.006
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发表时间：
2006-11-01
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
Imhof, Lorens A.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Fudenberg, Drew;Nowak, Martin A.;Imhof, Lorens A.
我们研究有限种群中的随机博弈动力学。为此，我们扩展了经典的Moran过程，将频率依赖的选择和突变结合在一起。对于2x2博弈，我们给出了当突变率较小时的长期行为的完整分析。对于3x3协调博弈，我们提供了一个简单的规则来确定在大人口中将选择哪种策略。当种群较大时，我们模型中的预期运动类似于标准复制子动力学，但当种群较小时，预期运动与标准复制子动力学有质的不同。我们的分析表明，即使在大型有限种群中，类复制者系统的行为也可能与标准复制者动力学的行为不同。作为一个应用，我们考虑选择性语言动力学。我们决定哪种语言将在有限的大量人口中使用。这一结果有一个直观的解释，但从复制子动力学的分析中是不能预期的。(C)2006 Elsevier Inc.保留所有权利。
We study stochastic game dynamics in finite populations. To this end we extend the classical Moran process to incorporate frequency-dependent selection and mutation. For 2 x 2 games, we give a complete analysis of the long-run behavior when mutation rates are small. For 3 x 3 coordination games, we provide a simple rule to determine which strategy will be selected in large populations. The expected motion in our model resembles the standard replicator dynamics when the population is large, but is qualitatively different when the population is small. Our analysis shows that even in large finite populations the behavior of a replicator-like system can be different from that of the standard replicator dynamics. As an application, we consider selective language dynamics. We determine which language will be spoken in finite large populations. The results have an intuitive interpretation but would not be expected from an analysis of the replicator dynamics. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.