Impact of Confirmation Bias on Competitive Information Spread in Social Networks
Impact of Confirmation Bias on Competitive Information Spread in Social Networks
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DOI：
10.1109/tcns.2021.3050117
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发表时间：
2019-08
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Y. Mao;E. Akyol;N. Hovakimyan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Y. Mao;E. Akyol;N. Hovakimyan
本文研究了确认偏差对社交网络中竞争信息传播的影响，该社交网络由社交网络中的个人和网络层的竞争信息源组成。我们将信息传播问题表述为零和博弈，它在纯策略中承认独特的纳什均衡。我们描述了纯纳什均衡对公众固有观点、社交网络拓扑以及确认偏差参数的依赖。我们发现，只有当固有观点不中立时，确认偏差才会使平衡向中心移动，并且这种移动不会同时发生在竞争性信息源上。提供了著名的 Krackhardt 建议网络背景下的数值例子来证明理论结果的正确性。
This article investigates the impact of confirmation bias on competitive information spread in the social network that comprises individuals in a social network and competitive information sources at a cyber layer. We formulate the problem of information spread as a zero-sum game, which admits a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. We characterize the dependence of pure Nash equilibrium on the public's innate opinions, the social network topology, as well as the parameters of confirmation bias. We uncover that confirmation bias moves the equilibrium toward the center only when the innate opinions are not neutral, and this move does not occur for the competitive information sources simultaneously. Numerical examples in the context of well-known Krackhardt's advice network are provided to demonstrate the correctness of theoretical results.