On the mutually beneficial cooperative scheme: Dynamic change in the payoff matrix of international river basin schemes
On the mutually beneficial cooperative scheme: Dynamic change in the payoff matrix of international river basin schemes
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DOI：
10.1029/wr018i004p00764
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发表时间：
1982-08
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
C. Dufournaud
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Dufournaud
互惠互利是学者们看待国际流域合作计划的最常见标准。由于并非所有沿岸国都对完成这样一个项目作出同等的财政承诺，而且由于项目的利益将随着时间的推移以不同的比率累积到每一方，因此存在一种可能性，即其中一个伙伴将在有利于自己的时候选择退出。利用元博弈理论，本文探讨了开放的可能性，在哥伦比亚和下湄公河流域计划，通过展示各种动态路径的净收益的合作和主权计划的河岸。本文最后指出，传统的互利标准观点并不适用于所有情况。
Mutual benefit is the most common criterion by which scholars view international cooperative river basin schemes. Since all riparians are not equally committed financially to the completion of such a project and since the benefits of the project will accrue to each party at different rates over time, a probability exists that one of the partners will opt out at a point advantageous to suit himself. Utilizing metagame theory, this paper explores the possibilities open to riparians in the Columbia and Lower Mekong River Basin schemes by demonstrating the various dynamic paths of the net benefits of such cooperative and sovereign schemes. The paper concludes by arguing that the traditional view of the criterion of mutual benefit is not valid in all cases.