TODA: Truthful Online Double Auction for Spectrum Allocation in Wireless Networks
TODA: Truthful Online Double Auction for Spectrum Allocation in Wireless Networks
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DOI：
10.1109/dyspan.2010.5457905
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发表时间：
2010-04
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
ShiGuang Wang;Ping Xu;Xiaohua Xu;Shaojie Tang;Xiangyang Li;Xin Liu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
ShiGuang Wang;Ping Xu;Xiaohua Xu;Shaojie Tang;Xiangyang Li;Xin Liu
次用户的频谱使用通常发生在某个地理区域和某个时间间隔内，并且请求通常以在线方式出现。考虑到主用户和次用户的自私行为，设计在线双频谱拍卖方法势在必行。最重要的挑战是如何使在线双向拍卖具有经济稳健性（特别是真实性）。不幸的是，现有的设计要么不考虑在线请求，要么在应用于主用户和次用户都可能自私的场景时变得不真实。在本文中，我们解决这个问题，提出了户田，一个一般的框架，真实的在线双重拍卖频谱分配。假设存在一个中心拍卖人，二级用户请求的到达服从泊松分布。在收到在线频谱请求后，中央拍卖师将立即决定哪些次要用户和主要用户将赢得拍卖，并将获胜的主要用户和次要用户进行匹配，以及决定次要用户应该支付多少钱，主要用户应该得到多少钱。不允许抢占现有频谱使用。我们研究的情况下，其中的冲突图的二次用户是一个完整的图，这发生在城市地区的二次用户的分布是非常密集的。在这种情况下，我们为主要用户和次要用户设计了防策略（真实）机制。据我们所知，我们是第一个为频谱分配设计真实的在线双重拍卖机制的公司。我们的仿真结果表明，我们的机制的预期社会效率比始终是80%以上的离线VCG机制和频谱利用率是70%左右，当系统高负载。
The spectrum usage by a secondary user often happens in a certain geographical region and in a certain time interval, and the requests often come in an online fashion. Considering the selfish behaviors of primary users and secondary users, it is imperative to design online double spectrum auction methods. The most significant challenge is how to make the online double auction economic-robust (truthful in particular). Unfortunately, existing designs either do not consider the online requests or become untruthful when applied to scenarios when both primary users and secondary users could be selfish. In this paper, we address this problem by proposing TODA, a general framework for truthful online double auction for spectrum allocation. We assume that there is a central auctioneer, and the arrivals of secondary users' requests follow Poisson distribution. Upon receiving online spectrum requests, the central auctioneer will decide immediately which secondary and primary users will win the auction, and match winning primary users and secondary users, as well as decide how much secondary users should pay and primary users should get. To preempt existing spectrum usage is not allowed. We study the case in which the conflict graph of secondary users is a complete graph, which occurs in the urban area where the distribution of the secondary users is very dense. In this case, we design strategyproof (truthful) mechanisms for both the primary users and secondary users. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to design truthful online double auction mechanisms for spectrum allocation. Our simulation results show that the expected social efficiency ratio of our mechanism is always above 80% compared with the off-line VCG mechanism and the spectrum utilization ratio is around 70% when the system is highly loaded.