A characterization of the Walras rule
A characterization of the Walras rule
复制标题
瓦尔拉斯规则的表征
DOI：
10.1007/bf00186278
复制
发表时间：
1995
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Sang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ryo;Sang
这篇论文有三个目的。首先，我们改进了Nagahisa(JET 1991)提出的Walras规则在一个比他所用的域更自然和更简单的领域上的刻画。我们证明了Walras规则是定义在定义域上且满足个体理性、帕累托效率和局部独立性的唯一社会选择规则。其次，假设捐赠是集体所有的，我们证明了在平分基础上运作的Walras规则是唯一满足无嫉妒、帕累托效率和地方独立性的社会选择规则。第三，证明了对于满足个体理性和帕累托效率的社会选择规则，局部独立性等价于满足博弈形式凸性的纳什实现条件。
This paper has three purposes. First, we refine the characterization of the Walras rule proposed by Nagahisa (JET 1991) over a more natural and simple domain than the one he employed. We show that the Walras rule is the only social choice rule defined over the domain and satisfyingIndividual Rationality, Pareto Efficiency, andLocal Independence. Second, assuming endowments to be collectively owned, we show that the Walras rule operated from equal division is the only social choice rule satisfyingNo Envy, Pareto Efficiency, andLocal Independence. Third, we show that for every social choice rule satisfyingIndividual RationalityandPareto Efficiency, Local Independenceis equivalent to a condition of Nash implementation with a game form satisfyingconvexity.