A general quantitative cryptanalysis of permutation-only multimedia ciphers against plaintext attacks
A general quantitative cryptanalysis of permutation-only multimedia ciphers against plaintext attacks
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DOI：
10.1016/j.image.2008.01.003
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发表时间：
2008-03-01
影响因子：
3.5
通讯作者：
Lo, Kwok-Tung
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Li, Shujun;Li, Chengqing;Lo, Kwok-Tung
近年来，秘密置换已被广泛用于保护不同类型的多媒体数据，包括语音文件，数字图像和视频。基于纯置换多媒体密码的一般模型，定量分析了这类密码抵抗明文攻击的性能。当明文的大小为M × N并且具有L个不同级别的值时，在明文中每个元素均匀分布的假设下，已经得出了以下定量密码分析结果：（1）所有仅置换的多媒体密码实际上对于已知/选择的明文攻击是不安全的，在这个意义上，仅O（log（L）（MN））已知/选择的明文足以恢复不少于（在平均意义上）明文的一半元素;（2）已知/选择明文攻击的计算复杂度仅为O（n中心点（MN）（2）），其中n是使用的已知/选择明文的数量。当明文具有非均匀分布时，还讨论了所需明文的数量和计算复杂度。实验证明了已知明文攻击对一个典型的纯置换图像密码的真实的性能。(c)2008 Elsevier B. V.保留所有权利。
In recent years secret permutations have been widely used for protecting different types of multimedia data, including speech files, digital images and videos. Based on a general model of permutation-only multimedia ciphers, this paper performs a quantitative cryptanalysis on the performance of these kind of ciphers against plaintext attacks. When the plaintext is of size M x N and with L different levels of values, the following quantitative cryptanalytic findings have been concluded under the assumption of a uniform distribution of each element in the plaintext: (1) all permutation-only multimedia ciphers are practically insecure against known/chosen-plaintext attacks in the sense that only O(log(L)(MN)) known/chosen plaintexts are sufficient to recover not less than (in an average sense) half elements of the plaintext; (2) the computational complexity of the known/chosen-plain text attack is only O(n center dot (MN)(2)), where n is the number of known/chosen plaintexts used. When the plaintext has a non-uniform distribution, the number of required plaintexts and the computational complexity is also discussed. Experiments are given to demonstrate the real performance of the known-plaintext attack for a typical permutation-only image cipher. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.