Gender, Social Norms, and Household Production in Burkina Faso

Gender, Social Norms, and Household Production in Burkina Faso
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DOI:
10.1086/669258
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发表时间:
2013-04-01
影响因子:
2
通讯作者:
Wahhaj, Zaki
Wahhaj, Zaki
中科院分区:
经济学4区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Kazianga, Harounan;Wahhaj, Zaki

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关于家庭内部分配的经验研究表明,在许多情况下,性别是家庭内部资源分配的一个重要决定因素。然而,在理论文献中,为什么性别在家庭中重要仍然是一个悬而未决的问题。在这篇文章中,我们提出了一种简单的家庭内部分配模式,该模式基于特定的社会制度,用于组织西非某些民族的农业生产。我们强调指出,这一机构在解决某些承诺和信息不对称问题的同时,也可能导致家庭内部生产资源和消费的性别分配模式。利用对布基纳法索农业家庭的调查,我们发现,与这一理论一致,户主拥有的地块比其他家庭成员拥有的类似特征的地块耕种更密集,产量更高。不当家的男性和女性家庭成员的产量相似。我们认为,户主获得的更高产量可以从社会规范的角度进行解释,这些社会规范要求户主将他控制的一些地块的收入完全花在家庭公共产品上,这反过来又激励其他家庭成员自愿在他的农场上贡献劳动力。使用支出数据以及衡量降雨量来捕捉天气对农业收入的冲击,我们表明,户主确实比其他家庭成员有更高的边际支出家庭公共产品的倾向。户主通常是男性,这一事实解释了不同农田的劳动力分配和产量的性别模式。
Empirical studies of intrahousehold allocation have revealed that, in many instances, gender is an important determinant in the allocation of resources within the household. Yet, within the theoretical literature, why gender matters within the household remains an open question. In this article, we propose a simple model of intrahousehold allocation based on a particular social institution for the organization of agricultural production practiced among certain ethnic groups in West Africa. We highlight how this institution, while resolving certain problems of commitment and informational asymmetry, can also lead to a gendered pattern in the allocation of productive resources and consumption within the household. Using a survey of agricultural households in Burkina Faso, we show, consistent with this theory, that plots owned by the head of the household are farmed more intensively and achieve higher yields than plots with similar characteristics owned by other household members. Male and female family members who do not head the household achieve similar yields. We argue that the higher yields achieved by the household head may be explained in terms of social norms that require him to spend the earnings from some plots under his control exclusively on household public goods, which in turn provides other family members the incentive to voluntarily contribute labor on his farms. Using expenditures data, as well as measures of rainfall to capture weather-related shocks to agricultural income, we show that the household head has, indeed, a higher marginal propensity to spend on household public goods than other household members. The fact that the head of the household is usually male accounts for the gendered pattern in labor allocation and yields across different farm plots.