The Affective Subject: Emmanuel Levinas and Michel Henry on the Role of Affect in the Constitution of Subjectivity
The Affective Subject: Emmanuel Levinas and Michel Henry on the Role of Affect in the Constitution of Subjectivity
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情感主体：伊曼纽尔·列维纳斯和米歇尔·亨利论情感在主体性构成中的作用
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发表时间：
2017
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通讯作者：
Joshua S. Lupo
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作者：
Joshua S. Lupo
在这篇文章中，我发展了一个主观性的情感帐户，借鉴了现象学传统中的两个重要的哲学家。许多人声称，伊曼纽尔·列维纳斯和米歇尔·亨利的哲学是完全对立的。列维纳斯通常被认为是一个超越哲学家，而亨利通常被认为是一个内在的哲学家。通过关注影响在两位思想家的作品中所扮演的角色，我证明了内在性的痕迹可以在列维纳斯身上找到，而超越性的痕迹可以在亨利身上找到。这个解释表明，自我因为是情感的，所以是独一无二的，与世界分离，但也是多孔的，容易受到他人的影响。
In this essay, I develop an affective account of subjectivity that draws on two important philosophers within the phenomenological tradition. Many claim that the philosophies of Emmanuel Levinas and Michel Henry are entirely opposed to one another. Levinas is typically thought of as a philosopher of transcendence, while Henry is typically thought of as a philosopher of immanence. By attending to the role that affect plays in the work of both thinkers, I demonstrate that traces of immanence can be located in Levinas, while traces of transcendence can be located in Henry. What this account shows is that the self, because it is affective, is unique and set apart from the world, but also porous and open to being affected by others.