Cooperation, pervasive impact, and coercion: On the scope (not site) of distributive justice
Cooperation, pervasive impact, and coercion: On the scope (not site) of distributive justice
复制标题
DOI：
10.1111/j.1088-4963.2007.00116.x
复制
发表时间：
2007-09-01
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
Abizadeh, Arash
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Abizadeh, Arash
众所周知，罗尔斯在《A Theory of Fustice》中将分配正义的范围限定在单一政体的国内语境中。[1]这一限制意味着公民对彼此有分配正义的责任，而对外国人则没有。罗尔斯的读者普遍认为，尽管他承诺所有人的道德价值平等，但他是基于两个假设来激发这种反世界主义的限制的。首先，他假定分配正义的原则只有在社会的”基本结构“的背景下才发挥作用。“只有具有共同基本结构的人才能出于分配正义的考虑而相互要求和承担责任。第二，罗尔斯的著名假设是，不存在全球性的基本结构，其基本结构是正义主题的社会是”或多或少自给自足的联合体”，其边界与当代政治的边界相对应。罗尔斯的读者认为，这一论点隐含地支持了他的《正义论》中对正义范围的限制：由于”正义的首要主体是社会的基本结构”，由于没有全球性的基本结构，正义的范围是国内的。2感谢《哲学与公共事务》的编辑迈克尔·布莱克、巴勃罗·吉拉伯特、凯瑟琳·卢、唐·穆恩、艾伦·帕滕、维罗妮卡·庞塞、莎拉·斯特劳德、丹尼尔·温斯托克以及参加2005年4月16日蒙特利尔大学研究中心研讨会的与会者提出的宝贵意见。这项研究得到了Fonds qu B cois de la recherche sur la socidt et la culture的团队资助。1.在本文中，除非另有说明，正义一词指的是分配正义，而不是罗尔斯所说的自然正义;我所说的世界主义者只是指分配正义的范围是全球性的观点，而我所说的反世界主义者则是指分配正义的范围不是全球性的观点。2.约翰·罗尔斯，《正义理论》（剑桥，马萨诸塞州：哈佛大学出版社，1971年），pp. 4，96，7; cf.第457页：”秩序良好的社会的基本结构的”边界”.是[假设是]由自给自足的民族共同体的概念给出的。"
It is widely known that in A Theory offustice Rawls restricted the scope of distributive justice to the domestic context of a single polity. 1 This restriction implies that citizens have responsibilities of distributive justice to each other that they do not have to foreigners. Rawls's readers widely thought that he had motivated this anticosmopolitan restriction, despite his commitment to the equal moral worth of all, on the basis of two assumptions. First, he assumed that principles of distributive justice come into play only within the context of society's" basic structure." Only persons with a shared basic structure have claims upon and responsibilities to each other arising from considerations of distributive justice. Second, Rawls famously assumed that there is no global basic structure, that the societies whose basic structure is the subject of justice are" more or less self-sufficient association [s]" whose boundaries correspond to those of contemporary polities. This was the argument that Rawls's readers thought was implicitly backing the restriction of justice's scope in his Theory of Justice: since" the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society," and since there is no global basic structure, the scope of justice is domestic. 2For valuable comments, I would like to thank Michael Blake, Pablo Gilabert, Catherine Lu, Don Moon, Alan Patten, Veronica Ponce, Sarah Stroud, Daniel Weinstock, the Editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs, and participants at a colloquium of the Centre de Recherche en fthique de l'Universite de Montreal, April 16, 2005. This research was supported by a team grant from the Fonds qu b cois de la recherche sur la socidt et la culture. 1. In this article, unless otherwise noted, the term justice refers to distributive justice, and not to what Rawls called natural justice; by cosmopolitan I simply mean the view that the scope of distributive justice is global, by anticosmopolitan the view that it is not. 2. John Rawls, A Theory of justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 4, 96, 7; cf. p. 457: the" boundaries" of" the basic structures of well-ordered societies... are [assumed to be] given by the notion of a self-contained national community."