Ranking opportunity sets on the basis of their freedom of choice and their ability to satisfy preferences: A difficulty
Ranking opportunity sets on the basis of their freedom of choice and their ability to satisfy preferences: A difficulty
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排名机会基于他们的选择自由度和满足偏好的能力：一个困难
DOI：
10.1007/s003550050112
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发表时间：
1998
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
N. Gravel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
N. Gravel
抽象的。本文考察了最近关于选择自由的文献所建议的扩大个人偏好定义范围的可能性。更具体地说，考虑了个人偏好取决于她面临的机会集和她从该机会集选择的特定备选方案的可能性。更具体地说，研究了这些偏好重视由包含集合论关系定义的选择自由的可能性，同时在某种意义上与相对于机会集中包含的选项的偏好排序的存在相一致。本文证明了这种类型的传递扩展偏好存在的一个必要条件是不赋予选择自由内在重要性。
Abstract. This paper examines a possibility of enlarging the domain of definition of individual preferences suggested by the recent literature on freedom of choice. More specifically, the possibility for an individual to have preferences that depend upon both the opportunity set that she faces and the particular alternative that she chooses from that set is considered. Even more specifically, the possibility for these preferences to value freedom of choice, as defined by the set theoretic relation of inclusion, while being consistent, in a certain sense, with the existence of a preference ordering over the options contained in opportunity sets is investigated. It is shown in the paper that a necessary condition for the existence of any transitive extended preferences of this type is for freedom of choice to be given no intrinsic importance.