Role of recommendation in spatial public goods games
Role of recommendation in spatial public goods games
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/j.physa.2012.11.024
复制
发表时间：
2013-05
影响因子：
3.3
通讯作者：
Zhihu Yang;Zhi Li;Te Wu;Long Wang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Zhihu Yang;Zhi Li;Te Wu;Long Wang
我们研究了在一个共同进化的公共产品博弈中推荐的作用，在这个博弈中，群体可以根据群体的质量推荐他们的成员与当前群体之外的个体建立新的关系。有趣的是，对于正方形格和ER图，存在最优的推荐组质量，导致合作和推荐之间的正反馈。合作者、背叛者、推荐合作者和推荐背叛者的空间模式快照表明，如果群体质量适合推荐，合作和推荐可以同时出现。此外，我们发现，本地推荐提高合作比全球推荐。作为推广，我们也给出了Barabási-Albert网络的结果。推荐对Barabási-Albert网络合作的积极影响与群体质量无关。我们的研究结果提供了一个洞察合作的演变在真实的社会系统。
We study the role of recommendation in a co-evolutionary public goods game in which groups can recommend their members for establishment of new relationships with individuals outside the current group according to group quality. Intriguingly, for square lattices and ER graphs there exists optimal group quality for recommendation that induces positive feedback between cooperation and recommendation. Snapshots of spatial patterns of cooperators, defectors, recommended cooperators and recommended defectors show that if group quality is appropriate for recommendation, cooperation and recommendation can simultaneously emerge. Moreover, we find that local recommendation improves cooperation more than global recommendation. As an extension, we also present results for Barabási–Albert networks. The positive effect of recommendation on cooperation for Barabási–Albert networks is independent of group quality. Our results provide an insight into the evolution of cooperation in real social systems.