Governors as Opportunists: Evidence from Disaster Declaration Requests
Governors as Opportunists: Evidence from Disaster Declaration Requests
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州长作为机会主义者：来自灾难声明请求的证据
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Andrew Reeves
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Gasper;Andrew Reeves
州长们请求联邦援助的动机是什么？我们认为，州长在请求总统宣布灾难时，会利用其所在州的选举重要性来投机取巧，从而为各州提供资金并为总统提供潜在的选票。我们探讨了州长要求的两个方面。首先，我们假设只有符合连任资格的州长，尤其是对财政平衡敏感的州长，才会表现出机会主义行为。其次，我们研究摇摆州州长的要求是否受到总统党派之争的影响。由于灾难声明会产生总统选票，因此其他党派总统的请求可能会影响总统选举结果。通过分析 1972 年至 2006 年的每月申报请求，我们发现政治变量会影响州长提出超出客观需求的要求，而战场州州长会毫不犹豫地向其他党主席提出请求。州长和总统之间的选举动态影响联邦资源的分配，超出了实际需要。
What motivates governors as they request federal aid? We argue that governors act opportunistically by leveraging their states' electoral importance when requesting presidential disaster declarations, which provide dollars to states and potential votes for presidents. We explore two aspects of gubernatorial requests. First, we hypothesize that only reelection eligible governors, especially sensitive to fiscal balance, will behave opportunistically. Second, we examine if battleground state governors' requests are influenced by the partisanship of the president. Since disaster declarations yield presidential votes, requesting from an other party president could influence presidential election outcomes. Analyzing monthly declaration requests from 1972 to 2006, we find that political variables influence governors to ask above and beyond objective measures of need, and battleground state governors do not hesitate to request from other party presidents. The electoral dynamics between governors and presidents influence the allocation of federal resources beyond actual need.
DOI：
10.2307/2149903
发表时间：
1981-01
期刊：
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影响因子：
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作者：
M. Fiorina
通讯作者：
M. Fiorina