OPTIMAL PAY-AS-YOU-GO SOCIAL SECURITY WITH ENDOGENOUS RETIREMENT
OPTIMAL PAY-AS-YOU-GO SOCIAL SECURITY WITH ENDOGENOUS RETIREMENT
复制标题
最佳现收现付社会保障与内生退休
DOI：
10.1017/s1365100517000062
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
K. Miyazaki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
K. Miyazaki
This paper considers an overlapping-generations model with pay-as-you-go social security and retirement decision making by an old agent. In addition, this paper assumes that labor productivity depreciates. Under this setting, socially optimal allocations are examined.最佳分配是当社会规划者分配资源并迫使老代理人按照自己的意愿工作和退休时，福利最大化的分配。当社会规划者在去中心化经济中只能使用现收现付的社会保障时，次佳分配是一种福利最大化的分配方式。本文找到了旧代理人的劳动生产率范围，以便在去中心化经济中实现最佳分配。这一发现与 Michel 和 Pestieau 的研究结果不同[“代际重叠增长模式中的社会保障和提前退休”，经济与金融年鉴，2013]，后者指出在去中心化经济中无法实现最优分配。
This paper considers an overlapping-generations model with pay-as-you-go social security and retirement decision making by an old agent. In addition, this paper assumes that labor productivity depreciates. Under this setting, socially optimal allocations are examined. The first-best allocation is an allocation that maximizes welfare when a social planner distributes resources and forces an old agent to work and retire as she wants. The second-best allocation is one that maximizes welfare when a social planner can use only pay-as-you-go social security in a decentralized economy. This paper finds a range of an old agent's labor productivity such that the first-best allocation is achieved in a decentralized economy. This finding differs from that in Michel and Pestieau [“Social security and early retirement in an overlapping-generations growth model”, Annals of Economics & Finance, 2013], which notes that the first-best allocation cannot be achieved in a decentralized economy.
通过消费税为社会保障融资：政治经济学视角
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
--
作者：
小西秀樹;小西秀樹;Hideki Konishi;小西秀樹;小西秀樹;小西秀樹;Hideki Konishi;小西秀樹;小西秀樹;小西秀樹;Hideki Konishi
通讯作者：
Hideki Konishi