RELATIONSHIP LENDING AND LINES OF CREDIT IN SMALL FIRM FINANCE
RELATIONSHIP LENDING AND LINES OF CREDIT IN SMALL FIRM FINANCE
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DOI：
10.1086/296668
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发表时间：
1995-07-01
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
UDELL, GF
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
BERGER, AN;UDELL, GF
本文探讨了关系贷款在小公司融资中的作用。它审查了向小企业提供的银行信用额度（L/C）的价格和非价格条款。对信用证的关注允许对一种贷款合同进行审查，其中银行与借款人的关系可能是解决与小企业融资相关的信息不对称问题的重要机制。我们发现，与银行关系较长的借款人支付的利率较低，并且抵押品的可能性较小。这些结果与关系贷款产生有关借款人质量的有价值信息的理论观点是一致的。
This article examines the role of relationship lending in small firm finance. It examines price and nonprice terms of bank lines of credit (L/Cs) extended to small firms. The focus on L/Cs allows the examination of a type of loan contract in which the bank-borrower relationship is likely to be an important mechanism for solving the asymmetric information problems associated with financing small enterprises. We find that borrowers with longer banking relationships pay lower interest rates and are less likely to pledge collateral. These results are consistent with theoretical arguments that relationship lending generates valuable information about borrower quality.