Exploring a Balinese irrigation water management system using agent-based modeling and game theory
Exploring a Balinese irrigation water management system using agent-based modeling and game theory
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DOI：
10.1016/j.agwat.2022.107951
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发表时间：
2022-12
影响因子：
6.7
通讯作者：
Fumi Okura;I. W. Budiasa;Tasuku Kato
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Fumi Okura;I. W. Budiasa;Tasuku Kato
在灌溉部门，由于气候变化和城市化引起的人口动态等社会问题，与水有关的冲突更加复杂。虽然灌溉管理转移（IMT）和灌溉管理（PIM）的可持续灌溉基础设施管理的实施，PIM/IMT实施的结果显示用水者协会（WUAs）之间的冲突和缺乏水用户协会（WUAs）参与管理。为了揭示PIM/IMT问题，基于代理的模型（ABM）有助于分析冲突，博弈论有助于分析合作管理的基础概念，如规则。本研究探讨了ABM和博弈论在分析地表灌溉用水和收获劳动力冲突中的适用性，并旨在提出解决由于城市化导致的劳动力资源枯竭而导致的冲突的方法。为了调查在社会变革的压力下合作的用水户协会，我们选择了印度尼西亚巴厘岛的用水户协会，被称为“subaks”。通过利益相关者分析方法确定了研究区5个subaks的水稻种植管理实践，并开发了一个ABM模型来模拟代表subaks的6个代理的水分管理。为考察采伐劳动力供给对水资源管理的影响，应用非合作博弈理论，设计了3种采伐劳动力供给情景和2种采伐劳动力供给策略。情景分析表明，在收割劳动力供应严重短缺的情况下，收割劳动力分配订单可能会加剧水稻年产量的下降。本研究还发现，虽然目前的管理措施维持了苏巴克人之间的合作关系，灵活的管理措施可能会加强合作关系，社会变革可能会加速农民的非合作行为。为了解决冲突，苏巴克人需要在更大范围内发展合作关系，但社会问题超出了社区内部的层面，需要政府干预，以有效地利用日益减少的资源供应。该方法将ABM和博弈论相结合，有助于发展PIM/IMT研究中可持续资源配置的社会水文分析方法。
In the irrigation sector, water-related conflict has been compounded due to social issues such as climate change and urbanization-induced population dynamics. Although Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) and Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) were implemented for sustainable irrigation infrastructure management, results of PIM/IMT implementations exhibit conflicts between WUAs and the lack of water users’ associations’ (WUAs) participation in management. To unfold PIM/IMT issues, Agent-Based Model (ABM) helps analyze conflicts, and game theory helps analyze governing concepts underlying cooperative management such as rules. This study discusses the applicability of ABM and game theory to analyze conflicts over surface irrigation water and harvesting labor and also aims to present solutions to increasing conflicts due to labor resource depletion owning to urbanization. To investigate cooperative WUAs amid the pressure of social changes, we chose WUAs in Bali, Indonesia, known as “subaks”. Rice cultivation management practices of five subaks in the study area were identified by stakeholder analysis approach, and we developed an ABM to model water management of six agents representing subaks. To examine influence of harvesting labor supply on water management, noncooperative game theory was applied, and three harvesting labor scenarios and two strategies were generated. Scenario analysis indicates that with severe shortages in the harvesting labor supply, harvesting labor allocation orders could compound the decline in annual rice production. This study also establishes that although current management practices maintain cooperative relationships between subaks and flexible management practices likely strengthen cooperative relationships, social changes could accelerate farmers’ noncooperative behavior. To resolve conflicts, subaks need to develop cooperative relationships on a larger scale, but social issues go beyond the intra-community level and will require government intervention to efficiently use deceasing resource supply. This method using ABM and game theory will contribute to the development of socio-hydrological analysis approach to sustainable resource allocation in PIM/IMT study.