Quality Improvement Incentives and Product Recall Cost Sharing Contracts
Quality Improvement Incentives and Product Recall Cost Sharing Contracts
复制标题
DOI：
10.1287/mnsc.1090.1008
复制
发表时间：
2009-07-01
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
Savaskan, R. Canan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Chao, Gary H.;Iravani, Seyed M. R.;Savaskan, R. Canan
随着公司将更多的产品设计和制造活动外包给供应链的其他成员，提高最终产品质量已经成为一项超越公司内部流程能力界限的努力。在本文中，我们讨论了两种合同协议，其中产品召回成本可以在制造商和供应商之间共享，以诱导质量改进努力。更具体地说，我们考虑(i)基于选择性根本原因分析的成本分担（合同S）和（ii）基于完全根本原因分析的部分成本分担（合同P）。利用超模博弈论的见解，对于每个合同协议，我们描述了当制造商和供应商的努力选择受到道德风险影响时，他们在平衡状态下为提高组件故障率而付出的努力水平。我们证明合约S和合约P都能达到第一最佳努力水平；然而，合同S为制造商和供应链带来了更高的利润。对于供应商产品质量信息未向制造商披露的情况（即信息不对称的情况），我们制定了一份合同清单，可用于减轻信息不对称的影响。我们发现，合同菜单不仅显著降低了制造商由于信息不对称而产生的成本，而且提高了产品质量。
As companies outsource more product design and manufacturing activities to other members of the supply chain, improving end-product quality has become an endeavor extending beyond the boundaries of the firms' in-house process capabilities. In this paper, we discuss two contractual agreements by which product recall costs can be shared between a manufacturer and a supplier to induce quality improvement effort. More specifically, we consider (i) cost sharing based on selective root cause analysis (Contract S), and (ii) partial cost sharing based on complete root cause analysis (Contract P). Using insights from supermodular game theory, for each contractual agreement, we characterize the levels of effort the manufacturer and the supplier would exert in equilibrium to improve their component failure rate when their effort choices are subject to moral hazard. We show that both Contract S and Contract P can achieve the first best effort levels; however, Contract S results in higher profits for the manufacturer and the supply chain. For the case in which the information about the quality of the supplier's product is not revealed to the manufacturer (i. e., the case of information asymmetry), we develop a menu of contracts that can be used to mitigate the impact of information asymmetry. We show that the menu of contracts not only significantly decreases the manufacturer's cost due to information asymmetry, but also improves product quality.