Similarity Judgments in Choice Under Uncertainty: a Reinterpretation of the Predictions of Regret Theory
Similarity Judgments in Choice Under Uncertainty: a Reinterpretation of the Predictions of Regret Theory
复制标题
不确定性下选择的相似性判断：后悔理论预测的重新解释
DOI：
10.1287/mnsc.44.5.659
复制
发表时间：
1998
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
Jonathan W. Leland
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jonathan W. Leland
Loomes和Sugden（1982）的后悔理论预测了预期效用的其他替代方案所隐含的选择异常（例如，违反独立公理）。它还提出了关于随机优势和不变性的理性违反的独特和有争议的预测。所有这些预测都严重依赖于关于可用替代品的统计独立性或依赖性的假设。这些预测都不依赖于备选方案的框架或表示。Leland（1994）表明，基于相似性判断的选择模型预测了后悔理论所隐含的选择。然而，与后悔理论相反，这些预测主要取决于选择的框架，而不是选择的依赖性或独立性。本文提出的实验结果表明，违反独立性，优势，和不变性发生的频率，在大多数情况下，不敏感的统计依赖性或独立的替代品，但敏感的选择的方式。这些发现支持了这样一个假设，即这种行为的出现是依赖于相似性判断的结果。
The Regret theory of Loomes and Sugden (1982) predicts choice anomalies implied by other alternatives to expected utility (e.g., violations of the independence axiom). It also makes unique and controversial predictions regarding the rational violation of stochastic dominance and invariance. All these predictions depend critically on assumptions regarding the statistical independence or dependence of the available alternatives. None of the predictions depend on the framing or representation of the alternatives. Leland (1994) shows that a model of choice based on similarity judgments predicts choices implied by Regret theory. In contrast to Regret theory, however, these predictions depend critically on the way the choices are framed and not on the dependence or independence of the alternatives. This paper presents experimental results indicating that the frequencies with which violations of independence, dominance, and invariance occur are, in most cases, insensitive to the statistical dependence or independence of the alternatives but sensitive to the way the choices are presented. These findings support the hypothesis that such behaviors arise as a consequence of reliance upon similarity judgments.