Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement: Organisation, Communication and Ideology
Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement: Organisation, Communication and Ideology
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贝佩·格里洛的五星级运动：组织、沟通和意识形态
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
A. Gagliardi
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作者：
A. Gagliardi
排除了与意大利共产党逐渐改善关系的可能性，但有一个“主导点”（第136页），这是由它缺乏自主权“关于世界共产主义体系及其最强大和最有声望的中心”（第136页）。在这种情况下，与常设仲裁委员会达成协议是不可想象的。摩罗的立场几乎没有留下任何误解的余地，但在接下来的7月7日，《纽约时报》写道，摩罗提议“与共产党人对话”（第137页）。美国驻意大利大使阿克利也表达了类似的担忧，他指出，摩罗邀请民主党对共产党采取新的态度。这些分析并不是没有后果的，正如基辛格在摩罗以外交部长身份于10月访美之前为尼克松准备的一份备忘录所表明的那样。国务卿向美国总统透露了他对意大利共产党可能进入政府的担忧。正是摩罗本人平息了这些恐惧，在与尼克松会面时向他保证，他将致力于重新组建一个中左翼政府。摩罗对基辛格说得更清楚，他告诉基辛格，“共产党人参与政府是绝对没有预料到的”（第162页）。事实上，随着“紧张战略”的开始（第169页），摩罗得出结论，与共产党人的对话“不仅是不必要的，甚至可能是有害的”（第180页）。这就是为什么，据作者说，只是在1975年选举之后，共产主义问题才“有力地”（第181页）重新占据了摩罗的思想。
rule out the possibility of a gradual improvement in the relationship with the PCi, but there was a ‘dominant point’ (p. 136), which was represented by its lack of autonomy ‘with regard to the world system of communism and to its most powerful and prestigious center’ (p. 136). Under such circumstances, an agreement with the PCi was not conceivable. Moro’s position left little room for misunderstanding, yet on the following 7 July The New York Times wrote that Moro had proposed a ‘dialogue with the Communists’ (p. 137). A similar concern was expressed by the American ambassador to italy, Ackley, who noted that Moro had invited the DC to adopt a new attitude toward the Communist Party. These analyses were not without consequences, as indicated by a memorandum prepared by kissinger for Nixon in advance of a visit that Moro, as foreign minister, was to make to the United states in october. The secretary of state revealed to the American president his fear that the italian Communists could get into government. it was Moro himself who assuaged these fears, promising Nixon on the occasion of their encounter that he was committed to re-forming a government of the center left. Moro was even clearer with kissinger, whom he told that ‘participation by the Communists in government is absolutely not anticipated’ (p. 162). with the beginning of the ‘strategy of tension’ (p. 169), in fact, Moro concluded that dialogue with the Communists was ‘not only unnecessary, but perhaps even harmful’ (p. 180). That is the reason why, according to the author, it was only after the elections of 1975 that the Communist question returned ‘forcefully’ (p. 181) to occupy Moro’s reflections.