The Role of Party Affiliation, Lobbying, and Electoral Incentives in Decentralized US State Support of the Environment
The Role of Party Affiliation, Lobbying, and Electoral Incentives in Decentralized US State Support of the Environment
复制标题
政党归属、游说和选举激励在美国国家权力下放环境支持中的作用
DOI：
10.1086/711583
复制
发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
3.6
通讯作者：
A. Olper
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
L. Pacca;D. Curzi;G. Rausser;A. Olper
本文研究了游说、选举激励和美国州长的党派关系对环境支出的影响。一个理论框架，强调游说利益集团对环境政策的潜在影响。环境支出的主要因果关系取决于州长的政治偏好。实施回归不连续设计（RDD），我们确定和估计的因果关系的影响，州州长的环境支出水平。我们测试州长是否倾向于偏离自己的政治偏好时，面对来自污染游说团体和环保组织的选举激励的压力。实证结果表明，当民主党州长负责，环境支出，平均而言，更高。然而，在石油资源丰富的州和/或污染工业在经济上重要的州，民主党政客倾向于分配较少的资源用于环境保护，这表明游说团体的政治压力很重要。
This article investigates the influence of lobbying, electoral incentives, and US state governors’ party affiliation on environmental expenditures. A theoretical framework is presented, emphasizing the potential impact of lobbying from interest groups on environmental policies. The major causal link for environmental expenditures depends on the governor’s political preferences. Implementing a regression discontinuity design (RDD), we identify and estimate the causal effect of state governors on the level of environmental expenditures. We test whether governors tend to deviate from their own political preferences when facing pressures from polluting lobbies and electoral incentives from environmental organizations. The empirical results reveal that, when Democratic governors are in charge, environmental expenditures are, on average, higher. However, in oil-abundant states, and/or in states where polluting industries are economically important, Democratic politicians tend to allocate fewer resources to environmental preservation, suggesting that political pressure from lobbying groups matters.