Hardware Security Primitives for Vehicles

Hardware Security Primitives for Vehicles
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DOI:
10.1109/mce.2019.2941392
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发表时间:
2019-11
影响因子:
4.5
通讯作者:
Carson Labrado;H. Thapliyal
Carson Labrado;H. Thapliyal
中科院分区:
计算机科学4区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Carson Labrado;H. Thapliyal

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在过去的几十年里,车辆技术的进步要求车辆内电子控制单元(ECU)的数量大幅增加。这些ECU需要与其他ECU进行通信,以实现全部功能。连接ECU的通信网络已被证明构成了显著的安全风险,因为它们可能成为攻击的目标。确保车辆免受攻击的安全性是一个复杂的课题,已经引起了人们的极大兴趣,成为研究的焦点。在本文中,我们将从硬件模块和物理不可克隆功能(PUF)方面重点介绍当前的安全方法。
In the last few decades, advances in vehicular technology have necessitated large increases in the number of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) within vehicles. These ECUs are required to communicate with other ECUs in order to achieve full functionality. The communication networks that connect the ECUs have been shown to pose significant security risks, as they can be the target for attacks. Establishing security in vehicles against attacks is a complex topic that has generated much interest as a focus of research. In this article, we will highlight current security approaches in terms of hardware modules and physically unclonable functions (PUFs).