Strategic capacity expansion under a potential entry threat
Strategic capacity expansion under a potential entry threat
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潜在进入威胁下的战略产能扩张
DOI：
10.1016/j.iref.2015.01.006
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
4.5
通讯作者：
Shinsuke Kamoto
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
橘川武郎;島本実;鈴木健嗣;坪山雄樹;平野創;Shinsuke Kamoto
本文研究了在潜在进入威胁存在的情况下产能扩张的战略投资决策。该模型推导了基于扩张阈值和规模的均衡投资策略，并对产能扩张的战略价值进行了评估。本文论证了在位企业通过战略激励来扩大生产能力，以阻止潜在竞争者进入市场，延长其垄断期。结果表明，扩张的战略价值足够高，足以诱使现有企业作为一个独立的项目承担未来产生负现金流的产能扩张。
This paper examines strategic investment decisions on capacity expansion in the presence of a potential entry threat. The model derives an equilibrium investment strategy on expansion thresholds and scales and evaluates the strategic value of the capacity expansion. It demonstrates that an incumbent firm expands its production capacity by strategic incentive to deter a potential competitor's market entry and prolong its period of monopoly. The results suggest that the strategic value of the expansion is high enough to induce the incumbent firm to undertake the capacity expansion that generates negative cash flows in the future as a stand-alone project.