Hub-Spoke Network Choice Under Competition with an Application to Western Europe
Hub-Spoke Network Choice Under Competition with an Application to Western Europe
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DOI：
10.1287/trsc.1030.0081
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发表时间：
2005-02
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
N. Adler
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
N. Adler
本文的目的是提出一个模型结构，分析了竞争框架内的轴辐式网络设计问题。在放松管制的情况下，航空公司发展了轴辐式网络，使它们能够通过聚集需求来增加班次，并通过降低机票价格来防止进入市场。虽然美国和欧洲的自由化是为了增加竞争，但这方面的结果尚不清楚。本研究评估航空公司利润的基础上，航空公司行为的微观经济理论下放松管制和影响的枢纽和辐射网络。通过一个两阶段的纳什最佳对策博弈，我们寻找在航空运输业的均衡。这个博弈适用于西欧，在那里，有利可图的枢纽和垄断均衡是明确的，双寡头均衡是潜在可行的，有足够的需求。
The aim of this paper is to present a model structure that analyzes the hub-spoke network design issue within a competitive framework. Under deregulation, airlines have developed hub-and-spoke networks, enabling them to increase frequency by aggregating demand and to prevent entry into the marketplace by reducing airfares. While liberalization in the United States and Europe was undertaken to increase competition, the results in this direction are unclear. This research evaluates airline profits based on a microeconomic theory of airline behavior under deregulation and the effect on hub-and-spoke networks. Through a two-stage, Nash best-response game, we search for equilibria in the air transportation industry. The game is applied to Western Europe, where profitable hubs and monopolistic equilibria are clearly identifiable, and duopolistic equilibria are potentially viable, given sufficient demand.