Competition, Loan Rates and Information Dispersion in Microcredit Markets
Competition, Loan Rates and Information Dispersion in Microcredit Markets
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小额信贷市场的竞争、贷款利率和信息分散
DOI：
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Andréas Heinen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
G. Baquero;M. Hamadi;Andréas Heinen
我们使用评级机构的一个新数据库研究了竞争对小额信贷市场贷款利率和投资组合风险的影响，该数据库涵盖了2002年至2008年间67个国家的379家小额银行。我们的研究揭示了非营利性和营利性小额银行的不同竞争效应。我们发现，营利性小额银行收取的利率明显较低，在集中度较低的市场上表现出更好的投资组合风险。特别是，集中度对贷款利率的影响几乎是以前银行业研究报告的三倍。相比之下，非营利性小额银行对集中度的变化相对不敏感。我们控制利率上限，这将极大地降低营利性小额银行的利率。然而，我们的研究也揭示了营利性和非营利性小额银行之间的竞争相互作用。特别是，当以盈利为导向的小额银行的比例增加时，非营利性小额银行的面值会恶化。最后，我们发现，即使在控制了信用登记机构的存在后，也有证据表明，特定于借款人的信息在营利性部门的竞争对手小额银行中的分散是一致的。
We study the effects of competition on loan rates and portfolio-at-risk in microcredit markets using a new database from rating agencies, covering 379 microbanks located in 67 countries between 2002 and 2008. Our study reveals different competitive effects in nonprofit and for-profit microbanks. We find that for-profit microbanks charge significantly lower rates and exhibit improved portfolio-at-risk in less concentrated markets. In particular, the effect of concentration on loan rates is nearly three times the one reported in previous studies in banking. In contrast, nonprofit microbanks are relatively insensitive to changes in concentration. We control for interest rate ceilings, which very significantly reduce rates in for-profit microbanks. However, our study also uncovers a competitive interplay between for-profit and nonprofit microbanks. In particular, the PAR of nonprofit microbanks deteriorates when the proportion of profit-oriented microbanks increases. Finally, we find evidence consistent with dispersion of borrower-specific information among competing microbanks in the for-profit sector, even after controlling for the presence of credit registries.