Relational Contracts and Inequity Aversion

Relational Contracts and Inequity Aversion
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关系契约和不平等厌恶

DOI：
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Julia Schmid
Julia Schmid
中科院分区：
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文献类型：
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作者：
Jenny Kragl;Julia Schmid

文献摘要

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我们研究了嫉妒对两个代理人的标准道德风险设置中关系契约可行性的影响。绩效是通过可观察但不可收缩的信号来评估的，该信号反映了代理人对公司价值的个人贡献。两种代理人都表现出不利的不平等厌恶。与文献相反，我们发现不平等厌恶可能是有益的：在存在嫉妒的情况下，对于一定的利率范围，关系合约可能更有利可图。此外，对于某些利率而言，声誉均衡仅存在于厌恶不平等的代理人中。
We study the effects of envy on the feasibility of relational contracts in a standard moral hazard setup with two agents. Performance is evaluated via an observable, but non-contractible signal which reflects the agent´s individual contribution to firm value. Both agents exhibit disadvantageous inequity aversion. In contrast to the literature, we find that inequity aversion may be beneficial: In the presence of envy, for a certain range of interest rates relational contracts may be more profitable. Furthermore, for some interest rates reputational equilibria exist only with inequity averse agents.