The Post-Coup Military Spending Question: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Time Series Analysis
The Post-Coup Military Spending Question: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Time Series Analysis
复制标题
政变后的军费开支问题：汇总横截面时间序列分析
DOI：
10.2307/1960442
复制
发表时间：
1982
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
W. Thompson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Gary Zuk;W. Thompson
尽管或因为十年的研究得出了相互矛盾的结果，军事政变或通过政变上台的政权是否会对随后的军费开支产生影响的问题仍然悬而未决。对相关文献的回顾表明，部分分析问题可能源于对军事政治行为的假设，以及与跨国变化分析相关的各种限制，以及完全使用横断面或纵向研究设计。此外，研究结果的一些差异可能是由于一些不同的分析员依赖不同的指标--既有独立的也有独立的。为了应对这些潜在的技术问题，这项对66个欠发达国家军事开支模式的分析应用了GLS例程，汇集了横截面和时间序列数据，以研究1967-1976年两种军事开支衡量标准与几个预测变量之间的关系，这些变量包括政权类型、政变发生、冲突程度、经济发展、武器进口和以前的军事开支。尽管实证结果因因变量的不同而不同，但我们发现，总的来说，关于政变类型的分布和时间的信息--军事政变、文职政变和混合政变--以及成功的军事政变对预测政变后的军事支出政策没有太大帮助。这一发现反过来表明，军事人员参与政治主要是为了捍卫或促进其企业利益这一关键假设，对于审查政变后的军事支出并不是一个非常有用的预测基础。
Despite or because of a decade of research that yielded conflicting results, the question of whether or not military coups or regimes brought into power through coups have an impact on subsequent military spending remains open. A review of the relevant literature suggests that part of the analytical problem may result from assumptions about military political behavior as well as various limitations associated with cross-national analyses of change, and the use of exclusively cross-sectional or longitudinal research designs. In addition, some of the disparity in research findings may result from the reliance on different indicators—both dependent and independent—by a number of different analysts. In response to these potential technical problems, this analysis of military spending patterns in 66 less-developed states applies a GLS routine, pooling cross-sectional and time-series data, to the 1967–1976 relationships between two measures of military spending and several predictor variables, including regime type, coup occurrences, level of conflict, economic development, arms imports, and previous military spending. Although the empirical outcome varies according to which dependent variable is examined, we find, in general, that information on the distribution and timing of regime types—military, civilian, and mixed—and successful military coups is not very helpful in predicting post-coup military spending policies. This finding suggests, in turn, that the crucial presumption that military personnel participate in politics primarily to defend or advance their corporate interests is not a very useful predictive foundation for the examination of post-coup military spending.