The Economics of Prefunding Social Security and Medicare Benefits
The Economics of Prefunding Social Security and Medicare Benefits
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预先资助社会保障和医疗保险福利的经济学
DOI：
10.1086/654328
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发表时间：
1997
影响因子：
7.7
通讯作者：
Andrew A. Samwick
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Feldstein;Andrew A. Samwick
本文提出了一个详细的经济学分析，为老年人的预付金福利，重点是社会保障，但指出一些类似的幅度为预付金医疗保险福利。我们使用详细的人口普查和社会保障信息来模拟过渡到基于个人账户强制性缴款的全额供资系统。我们所研究的基金制度将永久保持现行法律规定的福利水平，不需要新的政府借款（除了最终出售社会保障信托基金中正式的债券）。在转型期间，工资税和强制储蓄的综合税率最初上升2个百分点（总计为14.4%），然后下降，在不到20年的时间里，它低于目前的12.4%工资税。我们估计了这种预融资对资本存量增长和国民收入水平的影响，并表明，从长远来看，较高的税前工资和较低的工资税相结合，可以使扣除所得税和工资税后的工资提高35%以上。我们还讨论了分配问题，以及穷人至少可以像在社会保障下一样富裕的方式。随机模拟表明，强制储蓄率的小幅提高将使接收低于预定水平的风险降低到1%以下。如果政府决定不明确支付未来的社会保障福利，则分别计算政府可能发行的“前瞻性确认债券”和“前瞻性确认债券”的价值。
This paper presents a detailed analysis of the economics of prefunding benefits for the aged, focusing on social security but indicating some of the analogous magnitudes for prefunding Medicare benefits. We use detailed census and social security information to model the transition to a fully funded system based on mandatory contributions to individual accounts. The funded system that we examine would permanently maintain the level of benefits now specified in current law and would require no new government borrowing (other than eventually selling the bonds that are officially in the social security trust fund). During the transition, the combined rate of payroll tax and mandatory saving rises initially by 2 percentage points (to a total of 14.4%) and then declines so that, in less than 20 years, it is less than the current 12.4% payroll tax. We estimate the influence of such prefunding on the growth of the capital stock and the level of national income and show that the combination of higher pretax wages and lower payroll taxes could raise wages net of income and payroll taxes by more than 35% in the long run. We also discuss distributional issues and the way that the poor can be at least as well off as under social security. A stochastic simulation shows that a small increase in the mandatory saving rate would reduce the risk of receiving less than the scheduled level to less than 1%. Separate calculations are presented of the value of the "forward-looking recognition bonds" and "backward-looking recognition bonds" which the government might issue if it decides not to pay future social security benefits explicitly.