Regulating Capital Flows at Both Ends: Does it Work?
Regulating Capital Flows at Both Ends: Does it Work?
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监管两端资本流动：有效吗？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Naotaka Sugawara
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Ghosh;M. Qureshi;Naotaka Sugawara
本文探讨了是否可以通过在来源国和接受国实施资本账户限制（汽车）来监管跨境资本流动，正如约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯和哈里·德克斯特白色最初所倡导的那样。为此，我们使用了1995-2012年31个来源国至76个接受国（发达和新兴市场）的双边跨境银行流动数据，并将这些信息与这些国家各种流出和流入相关资本管制和审慎措施的新的综合数据集相结合。我们的研究结果表明，任何一端的汽车都可以显著影响跨境银行流量，两端的限制与流量的大幅减少有关。我们还发现了跨境溢出效应的证据，即各国实施的流入限制与流向其他国家的更大流量有关。这些研究结果表明，在来源国和接受国之间以及接受国之间进行政策协调，以更好地管理可能具有破坏性的资金流动，是一个有益的领域。
This paper examines whether cross-border capital flows can be regulated by imposing capital account restrictions (CARs) in both source and recipient countries, as was originally advocated by John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White. To this end, we use data on bilateral cross-border bank flows from 31 source to 76 recipient (advanced and emerging market) countries over 1995–2012, and combine this information with a new and comprehensive dataset on various outflow and inflow related capital controls and prudential measures in these countries. Our findings suggest that CARs at either end can significantly influence the volume of cross-border bank flows, with restrictions at both ends associated with a larger reduction in flows. We also find evidence of cross-border spillovers whereby inflow restrictions imposed by countries are associated with larger flows to other countries. These findings suggest a useful scope for policy coordination between source and recipient countries, as well as among recipient countries, to better manage potentially disruptive flows.