Who Should Act as Lender of Last Resort? An Incomplete Contracts Model
Who Should Act as Lender of Last Resort? An Incomplete Contracts Model
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谁应该充当最后贷款人？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Rafael Repullo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Rafael Repullo
本文提出了一个银行受到流动性冲击的模型，这种冲击需要从最后贷款人那里借款。两个目标不同的政府机构可以履行这一职能：中央银行和存款保险公司。这两个机构都对银行进行监督，即收集有关其财务状况的不可核实的信息，并使用这些信息来决定是否支持它。研究表明，最优制度设计涉及两个机构：中央银行负责应对小额流动性冲击，存款保险公司负责应对大额冲击。此外，除了非常小的冲击之外，它们应该以惩罚性利率放贷。
This paper presents a model of a bank subject to liquidity shocks that require borrowing from a lender of last resort. Two government agencies with different objectives may perform this function: a central bank and a deposit insurance corporation. Both agencies supervise the bank, i.e. collect nonverifiable information about its financial condition, and use this information to decide whether to support it. It is shown that the optimal institutional design involves the two agencies: the central bank being responsible for dealing with small liquidity shocks, and the deposit insurance corporation for large shocks. Furthermore, except for very small shocks, they should lend at penalty rates.