Equilibrium Joining Strategies and Optimal Control of a Make-to-Stock Queue
Equilibrium Joining Strategies and Optimal Control of a Make-to-Stock Queue
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按库存生产队列的均衡连接策略和优化控制
DOI：
10.1111/poms.12565
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Song Jing-Sheng
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Li Qingying;Guo Pengfei;Li Chung-Lun;Song Jing-Sheng
我们考虑了一个按库存生产的有限容量生产系统，该系统具有设置成本和延迟敏感的客户。为了平衡设置和库存相关成本，生产经理采用双临界数量控制策略，即当等待的客户数量达到一定水平时开始生产，当积累了一定数量的库存时停止生产。一旦生产建立，单位生产时间服从指数分布。潜在顾客的到来遵循泊松过程。客户是战略性的，即，他们根据效用值来决定是为了产品而留下还是不买而离开，而效用值又取决于生产经理的控制决策。我们制定的问题之间的生产经理和客户，前者是游戏的领导者Stackelberg游戏。我们首先推导出均衡顾客购买策略和系统性能。然后，我们制定的期望成本率函数的生产系统，并提出了一个搜索算法，以获得最佳值的两个控制变量。我们进一步数值分析了最优解的特征，并将其与非战略客户的情况进行了比较。
We consider a make‐to‐stock, finite‐capacity production system with setup cost and delay‐sensitive customers. To balance the setup and inventory related costs, the production manager adopts a two‐critical‐number control policy, where the production starts when the number of waiting customers reaches a certain level and shuts down when a certain quantity of inventory has accumulated. Once the production is set up, the unit production time follows an exponential distribution. Potential customers arrive according to a Poisson process. Customers are strategic, i.e., they make decisions on whether to stay for the product or to leave without purchase based on their utility values, which depend on the production manager's control decisions. We formulate the problem as a Stackelberg game between the production manager and the customers, where the former is the game leader. We first derive the equilibrium customer purchasing strategy and system performance. We then formulate the expected cost rate function for the production system and present a search algorithm for obtaining the optimal values of the two control variables. We further analyze the characteristics of the optimal solution numerically and compare them with the situation where the customers are non‐strategic.