Actuality and knowability
Actuality and knowability
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现实性和可知性
DOI：
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. Chalmers
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Chalmers
人们普遍认为，对于所有的p，或者至少对于所有可娱乐的p，(p当实际上是p)是可知的先验。甚至更广泛地认为，对于所有这样的p，可知(p当实际上是p)。从四个看似合理的前提来看，有一个简单的理由来反对这些主张。下面给出了论点。在这里，‘A’，‘E’，‘K’，‘’，^‘代表’实际上‘，’某人知道‘，’必然‘和’可能‘，而’→‘和’↔‘是物质条件词和双条件词。此外，q是没有人真正娱乐的任何(可娱乐和可表达的)命题，而r是没有人娱乐的命题q1
It is widely believed that for all p, or at least for all entertainable p, it is knowable a priori that (p iff actually p). It is even more widely believed that for all such p, it is knowable that (p iff actually p). There is a simple argument against these claims from four antecedently plausible premises. The argument is given below. Here ‘A’, ‘E’, ‘K’, ‘ ’, ‘^’ stand for ‘Actually’ ‘Someone entertains’, ‘Someone knows’, ‘Necessarily’, and ‘Possibly’, while ‘→’ and ‘↔’ are the material conditional and biconditional. In addition, q is any (entertainable and expressible) proposition that no-one actually entertains, while r is ¬Eq, the proposition that no-one entertains q.1